In this paper, we analyze the connection between the history of colonial rule and postcolonial development in Africa. We focus on the fact that many African colonies were governed by indirect rule. Under indirect rule, indigenous people are divided into two groups: a privileged ruling group and an unprivileged ruled group. Our model assumes that the ruled group cannot observe how the resources appropriated from them are divided between the colonial ruler and the ruling group. In this economy, excessive exploitation by the colonial ruler creates distrust among indigenous groups and a negative effect on postcolonial economic and political development.
Introduction
Many researchers have studied the connection between colonial legacies and postcolonial development. In relation to these connections, Bertocchi and Canova (2002) found that exploitation activities by a colonial ruler 1 have a negative impact on the growth rates of postcolonial African countries. They also found that the identity of the colonial power is directly related to growth rates after independence in these countries. Lange (2004) focused on the distinction between direct and indirect rule, and found that the degree of indirect rule has a negative impact on postcolonial political development in British colonies. 1 We use the term "colonial ruler" to refer to the governments of European countries that ruled the African continent in the colonial era.
N. Mizuno ( ) · R. Okazawa Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University Yoshida Honmachi, Sakyo-Ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan e-mail: n.mizuno@e01.mbox.media. kyoto-u.ac.jp Motivated by these empirical studies, this paper builds a model to highlight the relationship between colonial experience and economic and political development after independence in Africa. We focus on the fact that most African colonies were governed by indirect rule in the colonial era. We show that, under indirect rule, exploitation activities by the colonial ruler create distrust between the indigenous privileged class and other people, harming postcolonial economic and political development in Africa. This paper is motivated by the history of colonial and postcolonial Africa. We link poor economic performance after independence to the history of African politics and provide a plausible explanation for some historical events on the continent, such as the conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zanzibar.
The basic ideas of the model are as follows. We consider an economy which reflects African history during the colonial period and after independence. In the colonial period, which corresponds to the first stage in the model, there exist a colonial ruler and two indigenous groups. The colonial ruler appoints one group to a ruling position. Therefore, the indigenous people are divided into a privileged ruling group and an unprivileged ruled group. The colonial ruler instructs the ruling group to transfer the resources of the indigenous people to the colonial ruler. This setup captures the indirect rule in the colony.
Using the political power given by the colonial ruler, the ruling group can exploit the resources of the ruled group for its own consumption. Therefore, the resources of the ruled group are transferred to both the colonial ruler and the ruling group. The extent of exploitation by the ruling group depends upon the ruling group's preferences, and, most importantly, its "altruism" for the ruled group.
The information structure of the economy is as follows. The ruled group cannot observe how many resources are transferred to the ruling group, but can observe the total quantity of appropriated resources. This is because the resources of the ruled group that are transferred to the colonial ruler are collected by the ruling group. The degree of altruism of the ruling group is also assumed not to be observable by the ruled group. The ruled group infers the degree of altruism of the ruling group by observing the total quantity taken from them. Harsh exploitation by the colonial ruler causes the ruled group to distrust the ruling group.
In the second stage of the model, the colonial ruler withdraws. The ruling group retains political power and controls the government. The ruled group takes over the belief from the colonial period and, based on this belief, forms expectations about the policy which the ruling group adopts. The tyranny of the colonial ruler makes the ruled group suspicious of the ruling group and leads to inefficient activities of the ruled group, such as underinvestment and revolt. This paper is related to several works that focused on the connection between colonial experience and economic development. In addition to Bertocchi and Canova (2002) and Lange (2004) , Acemoglu et al. (2001 ), Grier (1999 ), and Nunn (2007 investigated the effect of colonial legacies on economic performance. Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Grier (1999) identified clear channels through which experience in the colonial era affects postcolonial development. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argued that extractive institutions were built by colonial powers in regions such as Africa where there was little settlement of Europeans, and that the colonial institutions shape current institutions and affect income per capita. Grier (1999) found that former British colonies have better economic performance than former French colonies, and that the difference can largely be explained by the educational level at independence. In this paper, we consider an alternative channel that connects the colonial experience with economic and political development after independence in Africa. Nunn (2007) provided a model explaining the connection between colonial experience and underdevelopment in Africa adopting a different mechanism than ours. In Nunn's multiple equilibrium model, indigenous people choose between directly productive and directly unproductive rent-seeking activities. Nuun has shown that when exploitation by the colonial
